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Introduction
Raising the question of normalizing, upgrading or regularizing slums[1] in Europe could be seen as 
provocative at a time when all local and national governments are very often doing everything 
they can to raze slums – perceived as the shame of this twenty-first century’s civilized world 
and as a reflection of housing policy failures since the 1950s, and when associations that 
support slum dwellers and ensure their daily survival have been campaigning for years for the 
implementation of integration projects to promote housing and jobs.
Yet, this question deserves to be asked for two main reasons, especially so in this book on 
informal settlements in the Global North and Global South. First, the option of onsite slum 
normalization or regularization resurfaced in the early 2010s in the Paris and Madrid regions, 
which serve as case studies for this chapter.[2] In both cases, given the seeming impossibility 
of rehousing all of the slum dwellers, these “soft” intervention methods are being discussed 
and debated. Second, for the comparatist researcher, it is surprising to see such a contrast 
between North and South. Certainly, in the major global cities of the southern hemisphere, 
onsite interventions are plentiful and help regularize whole neighborhoods, while international 
bodies advocate various forms of legalization and upgrading programs.
[1] Normalization may be defined in several ways. It can be physical or legal (Larson, 2002: 146). Normalizing may 
refer to upgrading programs, i.e., improving slums by building surfaced roads, or helping to consolidate a buil-
ding’s structure, as well as providing connection to water and electricity networks. Regularization refers to 
legalization by granting or selling property titles, or by changing the use rights of land initially designated as 
non-constructible.
[2] The empirical data used in this chapter are drawn from a doctoral research project carried out in France and 
Spain between 2010 and 2014 (Aguilera, 2015). The chapter also reworks the ideas presented and discussed at 
the “Should slums be normalized?” workshop, co-led with Grégoire Cousin during the one-day study session, 
“European cities: contemporary slums and their economy,” on 15 April, 2016 (MSH – Maison des Sciences de 
l’Homme, Paris-Nord).
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Besides the fact that the sizes of slums in the Global South and Global North are not 
comparable, what can explain why European city governments choose (or not) to normalize 
or regularize slums? In this chapter, we will attempt to explain why this option is sidelined, 
drawing on a comparative analysis of the situation in Paris and Madrid, and contrasting these 
with experiences in the Global South.
In Section 1, we set out the main research and debates on slum normalization, regularization, 
and upgrading policies in the Global South in order to outline the main issues – opportunities 
and risks – that undergird such policies. We then present the Paris and Madrid case studies 
to show why, since the 1960s, normalizing and regularizing slums have not been considered 
as a mode of large-scale action: national and local officials have consistently ruled out the 
idea of onsite consolidation, preferring to constantly displace these populations, designated 
as “undesirable,” through partial rehousing or eviction. Yet, some experiments have been 
undertaken by associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to help 
these populations survive and temporarily improve their living conditions in slums that time 
after time are destroyed (Section 2). Finally, we discuss the most recent debates that seem to 
be emerging in Paris and Madrid, against a backdrop not only of budget cuts that constrain 
rehousing capacity, but also social movements that support the idea of softer interventions on 
slums, which are after all places where people live (Section 3).
1  Insights from the Global South: implementation, effects, and debates  
around slum normalization and regularization
All over the world, slums are routinely cleared by force (Leckie, 1994), and the slum dwellers, 
left vulnerable, are pushed out to the city fringes (Dupont et al., 2013). Although these policies 
are accompanied by rehousing programs, they are often limited and selective, and do no more 
than disperse the slum communities, destroying their solidarity and local ties (Dupont, 2010; 
Bhan et al., 2013). The same findings hold true for European cities (Vitale, 2009).
This type of intervention quite often comes with forms of tolerance that open the way for the 
consolidation of informal settlements (Clerc, 2005). Tolerance may be the result of government 
failures (Maccaglia, 2009), but it can also be used as a strategy by some governments seeking to 
speculate on land (Smart, 2001). The fact of tolerating informal settlements also helps forestall 
the emergence of social movements and maintain patronage networks (Varley, 1998). In this 
respect, similar strategies are seen in Europe, where tolerance is usually associated with police 
harassment and social emergencies (Fassin et al., 2014; Aguilera, 2015).
Finally, the debates crystallize around regularization policies, which for many years have 
accounted for most slum interventions in the Global South, under the intellectual authority 
of the liberal economist Hernando de Soto, whose tenets have been relayed by international 
bodies such as UN-Habitat and the World Bank. According to de Soto, granting or selling 
property titles to slum dwellers gives them the incentive to improve their housing and 
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facilitates the construction of infrastructure (de Soto, 2000). A second option, based on soft 
interventions, is to improve living conditions in slums so as to gradually normalize the situation.
Yet, these virtuous circles are not linear and may even be empirically limited or invalidated 
(Varley, 1987; Durand-Lasserve et al., 2009). Some studies even show that such policies do 
not necessarily benefit the poorest inhabitants (Gilbert, 2002; Gulyani et al., 2012) as they 
contribute in some way to their “silent eviction” (Burgess, 1982; Desai et al., 2012). In fact, the 
policies implemented have not eradicated slums according to the United Nations, which admits 
that the estimated number of slum dwellers worldwide has continued to grow over the past 
decade (UN-Habitat, 2010).
This detour via the countries of the Global South provides a contrast for the cases found in 
the Global North and informs currently emerging debates, especially those in France and Spain.
2  Onsite interventions sidelined by slum policies in Ile-de-France and Madrid
The European cases differ from experiences in the Global South. To begin with, the reported 
sizes of slums are smaller. Next, the policies targeting slums in the 2000s were institutionalized 
to a lesser degree in the Global North, with the exception of Madrid, hence the need for 
comparison. Finally, when policies do exist, they prioritize soft onsite interventions, but alternate 
between systematic eviction of slum dwellers and slum clearance that selectively rehouses 
families outside the slums.
2.1. Madrid’s Franco legacy: policies for clearance, rehousing, and social support
While slums were already present in the Madrid of the early twentieth century (Vorms, 2013a), 
these became established in the capital’s southern and eastern outskirts following the Spanish 
Civil War in the late 1930s, under the combined effect of a massive rural exodus (Cabo Alonso, 
1961) and city-center regeneration policies that were partly responsible for ousting the poorest 
households to the peripheries (Castells, 1977; Vaz, 2006; Vorms, 2013b). The chabolismo (chabola 
translates as “shanty”) became a mass phenomenon. As a result, 16% of Madrid’s population 
(i.e., 250,000 people) were living in slums in 1950 (Castells, 1977: 51).
Effective slum policies were introduced in the form of housing policies by Franco’s Government 
not only in view of co-opting internal opposition to the regime and nascent social movements 
in the capital’s slums and squats, but also of freeing up land for private developers highly 
subsidized by the State (Castells, 1979). Some squats were legalized, but it was primarily the 
launch of major national rehousing schemes that propelled most of the slum clearance between 
1960 and 1980 (Vorms, 2013b: 53).
However, when the Autonomous Community of Madrid (CAM) – created at the regional level 
in 1983 – was confronted with the Government’s withdrawal from housing policies, there were 
3,000 families still living in slums (Nogués Saez, 2010: 104). As these families had not fulfilled 
the socioeconomic criteria to obtain the proposed dwellings, they had not been rehoused and 
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were categorized as both gitanos (gypsy) and marginal. This meant that the issue of inadequate 
housing was being ethnicized (not unlike in France), leading to the notion that when dealing with 
distinct groups such as gitanos, whose lifestyle is perceived as unsuited to life in an apartment, 
specific policies need to be implemented.
To set this in motion, a new institution in charge of slum clearance was created in 1986, the 
Consortium for the relocation of marginalized populations (Consorcio para el Realojamiento 
de la Población Marginada – CPM), under the joint supervision of the Madrid Mayor’s office, 
the CAM, and the Government Delegate’s office. The rehousing procedure comprised 
three main measures. More than 1,000 families (the most comfortably off) were rehoused in 
local authority apartments between 1988 and 1991 (CPM, 1986). Just over 250 families were 
relocated to outlying neighborhoods hastily built on slum sites (Barrios de Tiplogía Especial 
[BTEs] – Neighborhoods of special typology) (Franco, 2004; Lopez de Lucio, 1999). Finally, 
the poorest families were relocated to “temporary camps” intended to serve as an airlock on 
the way to towards more permanent housing. But, like the camps, the conditions in the BTEs 
deteriorated and rapidly became drug trafficking hubs, which prompted some families to sell 
their houses and return to the slums (Sevilla Buitrago, 2003).
Faced with what amounted to the failure of public policy, and after the changeover to a right-
wing regional government (Alberto Ruíz-Gallardón of the People’s Party [Partido Popular] 
criticized the slum policies of his predecessor Joaquin Leguina of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party [Partido Socialista Obrero Español]), in 1996 the CAM proposed the destruction of the 
BTEs and camps over the medium term, as well as the creation in 1998 of a new agency dedicated 
to slum clearance: the Rehousing and Social Integration Institute (Instituto de Realojamiento e 
Integracion Social – IRIS).
According to official figures, IRIS had to deal with over 1,400 families living in slums in 1998. The 
decision was taken to rehouse the families, spreading them out across the housing stock so as 
to limit the risk of ghettoization and avoid resettling already very vulnerable populations far 
away from the city. Social and educational programs were also key to supporting the relocation 
(Tejedor, 2002). The agency’s annual budget averaged 26  million euros between 1999 and 
2012 (Aguilera, 2015: 133). In 2012, IRIS owned 2,388 apartments, while its social workers dealt 
with more than 9,000 families and helped rehouse 2,030 families over a thirteen-year period. 
In July 2015, IRIS finally lost its autonomous status as an agency when the new CAM President, 
Cristina Cifuentes (former Government Delegate for Madrid) merged it with the regional 
social housing agency (Instituto de la Vivienda de Madrid – IVIMA).
These slum clearance policies pursued since the 1970s have fueled the growth of Europe’s 
largest slum, Cañada Real Galiana, which hosts 11,000 people and where families not rehoused by 
the CPM and IRIS have found shelter (Aguilera, 2015): since the late 1990s, it has become home 
to Spanish payos (non-gypsies), gitanos, Moroccan and Latin American migrants, and precarious 
populations. The slum occupies a 70 m-wide former livestock trail, stretching for 16 kilometers. 
It is divided into six sectors, from north to south, going from the most comfortably off to the 
most precarious. One of its central sectors is also a major drug trafficking hub.
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The stretch of territory raised a highly complex legal situation, as it straddles three municipalities 
(Madrid, Rivas and Coslada). This limited the public authorities’ intervention, while responsibility 
for clearance was passed back and forth among the municipalities concerned and the CAM. 
Moreover, the slum had been tolerated strategically as it served the dual function of safety 
valve for the slum clearance policies pursued in the center of Madrid, and informal settlement 
area for the families not rehoused. Under pressure from social movements and in order 
to recover land for major urban projects, the CAM finally passed a specific regional law for 
Cañada Real Galiana in 2011 that launched consultation procedures aimed at crafting an overall 
clearance program.
2.2. Policies, omissions, and “tinkering” in the Ile-de-France/Paris region
The first slums in the Ile-de-France region sprang up in the 1930s when the French Government, 
pressured by business leaders, called on a large workforce from Spain, Portugal, and Italy 
(Viet, 1998). In the 1950s, new slums then emerged to accommodate the Algerian workforce. 
However, at the time, slums were not perceived as a housing issue, but rather as a security and 
migration issue. State action took the form of police violence in the authorities’ search for the 
independence activists of the Algerian National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale 
– FLN) (Gastaut, 2004: 7) and in their fight to prevent consolidation of shack settlements 
(Lallaoui, 1993: 53).
On the other hand, an “assistance sub-market” (Tricart, 1977: 606) had been developing. 
Municipalities and social housing agencies relocated some families in old rundown dwellings 
or built new housing to less stringent standards. Some 100,000 temporary dwellings were 
also installed in disused army barracks, and the State provided loans to the first cités d’urgence 
(emergency prefabricated housing complexes). The idea of transitional rehousing emerged in 
the social movement that mainly mobilized squatter groups. But it was as a result of Abbé 
Pierre’s appeal on 1 February 1954 that Emmaüs set to work building emergency shelters: tents 
and “igloos” were erected, notably by self-build groups such as the “Castors.”
Drawing on these association-led experiments, the State launched the larger-scale production 
of emergency housing, initially dubbed “family promotion housing” then “transitional 
housing”: 12,000 units were thus constructed in 220 French towns at a total cost of ten billion 
euros (Lallaoui, 1993: 26). Sonacotral,[3] created in 1956, was responsible for overseeing the 
resettlement operations (Bernardot, 2007).
In 1966, a national survey by the Ministry of the Interior reported a total of 75,000 people living 
in slums, 47,000 of whom were located in the Ile-de-France region across some thirty slums 
(Ministry of Equipment and Housing, 1966). A confluence of three factors led Parliament to 
consider introducing a national slum clearance program in response to pressure from (i) the 
media (it was journalists who produced the first maps of slums and the surveys inside slums 
[3] Sonacotral: Société nationale de construction pour les travailleurs algériens – National company for construc-
tion of housing for Algerian workers.
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from 1965), (ii) various local elected officials (following various fatal accidents, mayors called 
for state intervention) and members of Parliament (the subject came up several times on the 
National Assembly agenda between 1964 and 1972), and (iii) social movements.
Yet, these programs initially amounted to “tinkering”[4] rather than planning. Moreover, while 
they enabled the rehousing of Spanish, Portuguese, and French slum dwellers in apartment 
blocks (Tricart, 1977: 617), Algerians were rehoused in transitional housing complexes (Blanc-
Chaléart, 2006: 7), a situation that persisted until the late 1990s (Cohen et al., 2012). The last 
slum was officially demolished in Nice in 1976.
Slums reappeared in the late 1990s, driven by the influx of migrants from Eastern Europe 
following the collapse of the communist bloc (Reyniers, 1993). As political refugee status was 
being increasingly denied to these migrants, they settled in the urban cracks of the Parisian 
“red-belt” (communist suburbs) (Jaulin, 2000). However, as in the 1950s, the foremost issues 
raised were not housing, but rather immigration, security, and public order. The State kept well 
away from the issue of poor housing conditions, preferring to discuss the problems posed by 
the so-called traveller communities – who did not even live in slums.
For nearly twenty years, migrants living in slums – then labeled as Roma in the public debate – 
were regularly evicted once or twice a year.[5] Families lived in confined spaces but, given the 
repeated evictions, had no time to consolidate their homes, while children were unable to 
follow a stable educational pathway (Thiéry, 2014: 28). Living conditions in the slums were 
highly precarious and presented significant health issues (Médecins du Monde, 2010). This 
reflects a political orchestration of “deterioration” (Fassin, 2014), through police harassment, 
non-removal of rubbish, and denial of access to drinking water and electricity, a decision 
taken by city halls for the sole purpose of pushing residents to depart on their own initiative 
(Romeurope, 2012; Amnesty International, 2014). A self-eviction policy was setting in 
(Fassin, 2014).
Municipalities on the left and right of the political spectrum systematically sent families on to 
neighboring municipalities and called for state intervention to evict or rehouse them, more 
often than not outside their own territory (Costil, 2011). National governments, both left and 
right, persuaded European authorities to regulate migratory flows. In a situation where the 
various competing bodies of territorial governance and public inaction systematically passed 
on the blame, humanitarian organizations and local authorities necessarily had to mobilize 
significant human resources to ensure the slum dwellers’ survival.
Here and there, local authorities set up alternative projects that recycled existing mechanisms. 
From the late 1990s, some municipalities rehoused families following evictions. But it was 
particularly from 2005, taking advantage of subsidies granted under the MOUS (Maîtrise 
[4] “Tinkering” refers here to an incremental, experimental, and often chaotic notion of public policy, as opposed 
to the barely credible vision of a hypothetical rational and planning-oriented decision-maker.
[5] Several surveys have attempted to estimate the number of slum clearances carried out, particularly since 2010 
(Goossens, LDH – Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, 2010–2015).
167
Normalizing and regularizing slums: what explains the sidelining of onsite interventions in Europe? 
d’œuvre urbaine et sociale – Urban and social organization program) scheme that around ten 
towns in the Ile-de-France region began to experiment with villages d’insertion (inclusion villages), 
following in the footsteps of the Municipality of Aubervilliers (Legros, 2011).
The implementation of these projects systematically follows the same pattern: a town finds 
itself having to deal with large slums, an accident (e.g., a fatal fire) unleashes the media agenda, 
and municipal teams then mobilize associations and institutional partners. The purpose of 
these “villages” is to temporarily settle some of the slum families in specific areas (Bernardot, 
2007). But all of these projects are selective: families are chosen based on social, economic, and 
health criteria relating to their “capacity to integrate.” The projects impose constraints, with 
strict internal rules governing everyday life. They are exclusionary and justify the eviction of 
most of those who are denied access to the project. In the Ile-de-France region, nearly 1,500 
people participated in these inclusion projects between 2000 and 2011, but over 4,000 others 
were not entitled to participate (Aguilera, 2015: 215). These non-beneficiary families have been 
repeatedly dispersed across different municipalities by municipal and prefectoral orders.
Since 2012, the State has nonetheless sought to regain leadership in slum governance, channeling 
this through two conduits. On 26 August 2012, the French Government issued a circular urging 
prefects to coordinate social support schemes in tandem with evictions, which were expected 
to rise. The circular, supervised by DIHAL (Délégation interministérielle à l’hébergement et à 
l’accès au logement – Interministerial delegation for accommodation and access to housing), 
has however remained a dead letter and done no more than facilitate police evictions by 
providing social survey tools. The second conduit for state action is the “Plate-forme d’accueil, 
d’information, d’orientation et de suivi,” AIOS (platform for reception, information, counseling 
and monitoring), created in 2015 under the auspices of the regional prefect. Again, this platform 
has been a disappointment to associations, as they are neither consulted nor convinced by 
political leaders, who still refuse to speak of “slums” and prefer to talk of “illicit encampments.”
3  Onsite interventions: an option left by the wayside
The comparative analysis over time of the Paris and Madrid case studies points up two invariants. 
The policies for both of the city regions have always given priority to clearance, which involves 
razing slums and relocating families either by rehousing them or by evicting them towards new 
slums. In rare cases, normalization experiments have been carried out, but these have often 
been undertaken by the third sector, while local authorities refuse to stabilize the situations of 
the slums within their municipalities.
3.1. Rare onsite normalization experiments: the third sector steps in to upgrade living conditions
The onsite interventions carried out are few and far between, and very often implemented 
by associations and NGOs rather than by the public authorities. In fact, NGOs are always the 
first to intervene in slums, launching pilot projects that were able to serve as the bedrock for 
larger-scale institutionalized public policies, as was the case in the 1960s in both cities: squatter 
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and self-build movements gave rise to “tinkering” approaches which became systematic and 
subsequently mainstreamed into regional policies.
The 2000s also saw this type of local experiment, which filled the void left by public inaction. 
The largest slum in Madrid, Cañada Real Galiana, has hosted a large number of architect, 
activist and student collectives that, over the past decade, have conducted social and 
urban-planning diagnostic analyses in order to contribute to the slum dwellers’ indigenous 
knowledge. On the one hand, this meant producing counter-diagnoses by mobilizing 
knowledge as a weapon to resist institutional urban projects (Appadurai, 2012; Deboulet 
et al., 2013). On the other hand, these diagnoses often gave rise to participative self-build 
projects that brought together architects and residents. Volunteers working for the 
association Architects Without Borders (AWF) supported residents in the slum’s Sector 5 
for the construction of a community center on abandoned land (Carriot, 2014). Likewise, 
a young architects’ collective, Todo Por la Praxis, had produced counter-proposals for the 
development of Cañada Real Galiana in 2011.
In the Ile-de-France region, the larger NGOs such as Médecins du Monde – highly active 
through its Roma Mission – and the Catholic Relief Services have maintained an everyday 
presence to ensure the bare essentials and prevent the spread of epidemics. Moreover, each 
time a slum springs up local support groups are created. These may or may not belong to the 
local Romeurope collectives that are dotted around the Ile-de-France region with support from 
various antennas coordinated by the National Human Rights Collective Romeurope. These 
collectives provide consumer goods and occasionally healthcare, and may physically intervene 
to improve living conditions by helping build dry toilets, provide waste collection or carry out 
maintenance on shacks. Recently the association Convivance successfully negotiated a no-cost 
lease agreement for a plot of private land to develop a self-build project with the residents of a 
slum in Ivry-sur-Seine, south of Paris.
At the margin of the villages d’insertion set up by municipalities, architect collectives and 
urban planners have turned slums into land hosting self-builds. This was the case in Saint-
Denis (north of Paris) following the eviction of the Hanul slum dwellers in 2010, as well as in 
Orly (south of Paris) in 2011, where the village d’insertion aimed to have the future residents 
participate in building their wood cabins. One association, PEROU (Pôle d’exploration 
des ressources urbaines – Pole for the exploration of urban resources),[6] has attracted 
attention due to its drive to “de-culturalize” the Roma question by intervening in slums at 
an architectural level to open them up to the world, but above all to improve the residents’ 
living conditions. For example, the association built a communal wooden building in the 
heart of the Ris-Orangis slum south of Paris as a venue for Christmas parties in 2012 (Thiéry 
et al., 2013).
These interventions may seem derisory compared to the repeated evictions by the prefectures 
in the Ile-de-France region, or to the massive rehousing carried out by IRIS in Madrid. They 
[6] For more details of this organization, see their website: http://www.perou-paris.org/ 
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nonetheless demonstrate that actors are envisaging upgrading operations that avoid the 
immediate removal of families, and these interventions may well, as in the 1960s, percolate into 
decision-making spheres and lead to experiments on a larger scale.
3.2. The return of onsite interventions? How the economic crisis affects the reshaping  
of local slum policies
The idea of onsite interventions seems to have resurfaced in Paris and Madrid as from 2010. 
The revival of this idea in Europe may be due to the fact that associations and some elected 
officials have observed that the policies formerly pursued have not necessarily borne fruit, and 
that the slums are still there, and even growing. The economic crisis could thus confirm the 
need to find intervention methods that are softer, more gradual, and thus less costly for public 
authorities. This could open up a window of opportunity for associative actors to promote 
modes of action that are more respectful of the social and territorial roots of slum families and 
facilitate more stable paths to inclusion.
As clearance proves impossible, the legalization option is considered in Madrid
IRIS had been clearing slums in Madrid since the late 1990s. But after 2007, the agency’s annual 
budget tumbled (40 million euros in 2007 compared to 20 million euros in 2012). Its wage bill 
also declined, as did the budget earmarked for housing (Aguilera, 2015: 133). In July 2015, the 
CAM – announcing the end of slums, but above all no longer able to fund an institution subject 
to debate – decided to merge IRIS with the regional housing agency (IVIMA) to create a social 
housing agency in charge of promoting and managing public housing, but also responsible for 
the Cañada Real Galiana dossier. This merger spelt the end of the clearance policy and heralded 
a new instrumentation of slum policies.
As soon as the 2011 regional law was passed, the CAM formulated alternative proposals to cope 
with the excessive volume of people to be rehoused in the event that an IRIS project were 
implemented. One proposal that falls under the framework agreement pursuant to this law 
is to “consolidate as many inhabited houses as possible, if they comply with residential zoning 
and if they are integrated into an urban fabric” (CAM, 2014: 6) Priority is to be given to the 
residential use of the spaces due to be normalized: “single-family” homes are targeted by the 
agreement, which clearly aims to seize the opportunity to demolish businesses, workshops and 
hotels, all with a view to producing a uniform urban morphology. Yet, this measure does not 
apply to Sector 6, the poorest and most rundown area of Cañada Real Galiana. The third goal 
concerns housing and advocates “access to ownership for as many people as possible”(ibid.: 6) 
Only those families enumerated before 2012 would be eligible for this, while the others would 
be excluded from the process and relocated to temporary housing. Finally, a review of the 
hitherto inalienable legal status of the land occupied by the slum would be considered so as to 
allow the sale of property titles and servicing.
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The framework agreement thus makes proposals in line with the normalization, then onsite 
regularization of Europe’s largest slum. Yet, this Law remains differential,[7] as it fails to cover 
the most precarious areas. It has also been subject to diverse criticisms from municipalities and 
associations.
Firstly, the framework agreement only applies to homes that lie strictly within the perimeter of 
Cañada Real Galiana: homes clustering around the slum would be demolished. Second, while 
the option of granting land titles seems to suit the dwellers, the idea of sale has sparked debate, 
particularly with regard to the selling price per square meter and the valuation of the sales 
price of houses. Although the prices are in line with those proposed by associations in the most 
comfortably off northern sectors, they are too high to give the poorest families in the southern 
sectors a chance of ownership. The question remains open-ended, but it is safe to conclude 
that at least part of the slum will be legalized.
The French debates on normalization
In France too, the debate on soft onsite interventions has begun to spread and, given the cost 
of an eviction (400,000 euros[8]), owners and public authorities may well find that this approach 
offers advantageous modes of conflict resolution.
Among those who support such ideas, the Fondation Abbé Pierre (FAP) advocates forms of “soft 
clearance” (Huyghe, 2016). This involves intervening discreetly to gradually transforming slums 
into towns, and step by step bringing the slum dwellers closer to common law arrangements, 
with social housing as the ultimate goal. Occasional physical interventions are carried out 
(street furniture, children’s games), while self-build projects are set up through cross-funding 
(especially municipal funds). Yet, support is not always the order of the day. In September 2014, 
the FAP and Médecins du Monde managed to design a project that aimed to progressively 
improve the living conditions inside the large Le Samaritain slum in La Courneuve (north of 
Paris), and in the long run rehouse the families and provide social and medical support. In the 
end, however, the municipality refused to pursue the project and subsequently ordered the 
eviction of the slum dwellers in August 2015.
In this case, normalization is only temporary and does not entail legalizing the slum but rather 
stabilizing situations for a while in order to facilitate social work, job searches, and children’s 
schooling. A recent study by Association Trajectoires, commissioned by DIHAL, confirms that 
slums are a stepping stone, a base that helps to sustain solidarity and stabilize relations with 
associations, but also, despite the sometimes difficult living conditions, it help the residents to 
save income with a view to subsequently accessing social housing (Association Trajectoires, 
2016).
[7] By “differential,” we mean unequal public treatment of social facts that are a priori subject to the same rules. 
This differential character is the result of mechanisms that categorize, classify, and prioritize social practices or 
groups.
[8] Several studies have been conducted to assess the cost of evictions (Cousin, 2013; PEROU, 2014).
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The debates then turn to how this normalization is to be conceived and what time lines will 
be involved. The Romeurope Collective accepts these forms of stabilization, but refuses any 
notion of permanence. Stabilization must be considered simply as a form of aid to leaving the 
slum. As in the 1960s, the collectives now envisage departures from slums as being gradual, 
measured, and adapted to individual and family situations, and thus based on social and health 
diagnostics.
As in Spain, the idea of onsite stabilization rather than a direct exit from the slums has made its 
way into the debates and prompted alternative experiments at a time when traditional public 
policies seem to have proved ineffective.
The reticence of local officials in a context of competitive governance
Cities are competing to make territories attractive (Brenner, 2004), and local officials are 
positioning themselves in a context of competitive governance. They voice their reticence to 
the idea of normalization for three main reasons. One of their key concerns about the slum 
issue is the “pull factor.” The imagined outcome of a dependency on handouts is systematic: 
offering help would attract more potential beneficiaries and thus create an unmanageable 
situation. This argument serves as justification for all slum clearance policies to be selective, as 
many related public policies indeed are.
A second apprehension relates to public order. Local elected officials are accountable to their 
constituents, and they hold the issue of public nuisance as a primary concern. Even if a slum’s 
closest neighbors do not complain (Windels, 2014), local officials are sensitive to complaints and 
the image of their municipality. A slum inhabited by migrants, even if normalized, still represents 
a stigma for the municipality. The officials – who here see eye to eye with associations – 
fear forms of “ghettoization” and never-ending projects located far from urban resources 
or transportation, as was the case in the 1990s in Madrid. Finally, even though soft onsite 
interventions are inexpensive, the question of operation cost is presented by city mayors as a 
major hurdle to setting up long-run projects.
To these obstacles stemming from the fears of local officials, we would add one final factor 
identified by our comparative analysis. Social movements and organizations that support 
slum dwellers mobilize conventional and legalistic resources that do not disrupt the public 
and political order. In the 1960s, in France and Spain alike, support for squatter or protest 
movements opened up greater windows of opportunity, and finally led to rehousing. Similarly, 
a comparison with the squatter movements of the 2000s shows that, when protest-driven 
actions or even illegal actions are employed, this pushes local officials to rehouse more quickly 
(Aguilera, 2015: 600).
Lastly, our comparison should be extended to pinpoint the conditions that have led to a greater 
number of onsite normalizations, as was the case in Italy, and particularly in Rome, Milan, and 
Turin, where the local authorities financed connection to water and electricity networks (De 
Salvatore et al., 2009).
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Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was not to deplore the lack of attention given to potentially 
miracle-producing options. As we have seen, onsite interventions have not eradicated poor 
housing conditions in the Global South, where the question spurs debate, as it does in Europe, 
even among those who take up the defense of vulnerable populations. The aim was simply to 
empirically and theoretically substantiate the causes of the differences between intervention 
models in a Global North and Global South faced with the same issue. Slums certainly vary in 
size, but they raise similar problems in terms of poor housing conditions and public management 
of urban informality.
The comparative dual-lens (North-South, Paris-Madrid) highlights the extent to which forms of 
public intervention and tools for action may be considered in certain cities, at certain moments, 
whereas in others they are not. It helps inform debates and gives insights into how the actors 
mobilize ideas and identify risks.
A comparison and analysis of the arguments around normalization in both the Global North and 
Global South raise a final debate on the issues of slums and poor housing conditions in general: 
the debate on security standards and norms. Most often, if not always, squats and slums are 
evacuated by prefectures in the name of the safety and health of their inhabitants. Yet, just as 
often, activist architects show that some sites are not as insalubrious (for transitory periods) as 
the eviction orders state. There is thus the need for a debate on the high safety standards that 
sometimes hinder experiments for gradual inclusion through informal settlements, without 
implying however the design of multi-speed normative systems (Delgado, 1997; Larson, 2002).
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